Trump’s Strike on Iran Was Ferocious — But Did It Work?
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Codenamed Operation Midnight Hammer, the U.S. airstrike on Iran was a massive military operation involving more than 125 aircraft. It marked the largest-ever deployment of B-2 stealth bombers and the first combat use of the GBU-57 — America’s most powerful bunker-buster bomb. Seven B-2s launched from Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri, undertaking a 37-hour round-trip mission to Iran with support from aerial refueling tankers and fighter escorts. Meanwhile, decoy planes were dispatched westward over the Pacific to mislead observers. U.S. submarines also launched dozens of Tomahawk cruise missiles. Despite the scale of the assault, Iran did not retaliate during the strike.
Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth described the mission as one that would “take the breath away” of most observers. He emphasized it was a precision operation, exclusively targeting nuclear facilities — not military personnel or civilians — and insisted regime change was not the goal. “As President Trump has stated, the United States does not seek war. But we will act swiftly and decisively when our people, our partners, or our interests are threatened,” Hegseth said, adding that Iran still has "every opportunity" to come to the negotiating table.
Still, behind the celebratory tone, a critical question lingers: Did the strikes actually succeed in dismantling Iran’s nuclear program?
Trump claimed the facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan were “totally obliterated” following the June 21 announcement and June 22 strikes (Iranian time). But General Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, urged caution, saying a full damage assessment would take time. Preliminary assessments indicated “extremely severe damage and destruction” at all three locations. Satellite imagery from U.S. firm Maxar, released later on June 22, showed clusters of craters along the mountainside.
The B-2 bombers dropped 14 GBU-57s on the deeply buried uranium enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordow — the latter described by Trump as the “primary” target. Meanwhile, Tomahawks struck Isfahan, a hub for uranium conversion, centrifuge production, and likely storage of highly enriched uranium (HEU). According to the IAEA, Iran held about 400kg of HEU enriched to 60% purity — just a short step from weapons-grade — enough to build roughly ten nuclear bombs if further refined.
Israel had already hit Natanz and Isfahan and crippled much of Iran’s air defense, paving the way for U.S. forces. But Fordow, nestled deep within a mountain, had previously been considered invulnerable to Israeli weapons. IAEA chief Rafael Grossi, who had visited the site, noted that its most sensitive parts are buried roughly 800 meters underground, while one European estimate puts the depth at 500 meters.
Before the strike, experts debated whether even the GBU-57 — nicknamed the “Massive Ordnance Penetrator” (MOP) — could effectively destroy Fordow. Some believed that only nuclear weapons or a ground invasion could do the job. The MOP can drill through 60 meters of standard concrete — potentially less if Iran used reinforced materials — but repeated strikes on the same location can dig deeper.
David Albright, a former IAEA inspector and current head of the Institute for Science and International Security, argued that Fordow was “more vulnerable than people realize.” Israel, he noted, possessed detailed blueprints of the site, including its tunnel layout, ventilation systems, and power sources. The site has a single visible ventilation shaft, and targeting it could render Fordow inoperable for years rather than just months. Post-strike images, some experts suggest, hint that the U.S. may have aimed precisely at these critical access and ventilation points.
Even if the bombs didn’t destroy every chamber of Fordow, the intense shockwaves might have devastated the delicate centrifuge systems inside. “Uncontrolled vibration is a centrifuge killer,” explained Richard Nephew, a former U.S. State Department official now at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He added that the IR6 centrifuges at Fordow — newer and more durable than the IR1s at Natanz — might still be significantly affected by repeated bunker-busting blasts. Powering down the machines might have helped protect them, but the shutdown process itself risks damaging the equipment, and there likely wasn’t time to fully disassemble them.
Originally revealed by Western intelligence in 2009, Fordow was once a top-secret facility. Now, the concern is whether Iran still maintains undisclosed enrichment sites and enough hidden HEU to restart its program undetected. Tehran has previously threatened to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty — a move that would bar IAEA inspectors from monitoring future nuclear activities. However, Israeli intelligence has proven capable of penetrating Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and security, even carrying out assassinations of scientists and military officials.
Unlike the more centralized and limited nuclear efforts of Iraq (1981) and Syria (2007) — both halted by Israeli airstrikes — Iran’s nuclear program is more widespread and resilient. Nicholas Miller, a non-proliferation expert at Dartmouth College, posed a key question: “Will this resemble Syria 2007, where the program was decisively ended, or Iraq 1981, where ambitions only grew stronger and required repeated interventions?” His bet, assuming Iran’s current regime remains in place, is on the latter.
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